In their seminal work on systemic risk in financial markets, Eisenberg and Noe [10] proposed and studied a model with n firms embedded into a network of debt relations. We analyze this model from a game-theoretic point of view. Every firm is a rational agent in a directed graph that has an incentive to allocate payments in order to clear as much of its debt as possible. Each edge is weighted and describes a liability between the firms. We consider several variants of the game that differ in the permissible payment strategies. We study the existence and computational complexity of pure Nash and strong equilibria, and we provide bounds on the (strong) prices of anarchy and stability for a natural notion of social welfare. Our results highlight the power of financial regulation -if payments of insolvent firms can be centrally assigned, a socially optimal strong equilibrium can be found in polynomial time. In contrast, worst-case strong equilibria can be a factor of Ω(n) away from optimal, and, in general, computing a best response is an NP-hard problem. For less permissible sets of strategies, we show that pure equilibria might not exist, and deciding their existence as well as computing them if they exist constitute NP-hard problems.
Introduction
The last major financial crisis and its aftermath have highlighted the systemic risks and resulting hazards for society that arise in financial markets, which are characterized by different, highly interconnected financial institutions. Over the last decade an increased research effort has been underway to analyze, understand, and manage the systemic risks in financial markets. Main aspects of interest are contagion effects and cascading defaults, as well as recommendations for suitable regulation on a national and international level.
A prominent approach in the area of systemic risk stems from the seminal work by Eisenberg and Noe [10] . Here the set V of financial institutions (or firms) is the node set of a directed graph G = (V, E). The directed and weighted edges e ∈ E express the debt relations among firms. In addition, each firm has non-negative external assets, which capture the value of property rights (such as real-estate, gold, business and mortgage loans, etc.) that the firm has acquired from non-financial institutions. Eisenberg and Noe discuss a clearing mechanism for such a market, in which every firm v uses its available assets to pay its debt. The clearing follows basic balance sheet identities and evolves rather mechanically. It is commonly assumed that payments are distributed among all creditors in a pro-rata fashion, i.e. for each interbank debt (i.e., each outgoing edge) firm v allocates a proportional share of its available assets. Similarly, a firm receives the payments for its incoming edges (so-called internal assets), which in turn are also paid proportionally to outgoing edges (until all debt is paid or all assets are distributed). In this way, clearing payments constitute a fixed point of the system. Eisenberg and Noe discuss existence and uniqueness issues of such fixed point payments.
While the model has been studied intensively over the last two decades, there are a plethora of open questions, especially towards understanding strategic and game-theoretic issues. In this paper, our focus are the strategic incentives and their consequences for clearing mechanisms in financial markets. For example, rather than using pro-rata payments, financial institutions often put priority on clearing certain debts first. In this way, a firm v could profit substantially when using a suitable priority-based payment scheme -by clearing certain debt first, the money propagates through the network and returns to v in the form of additional internal assets. In the Eisenberg-Noe model, it is easy to see that the intuitive pro-rata clearing mechanism is not always incentive compatible, and strategic incentives of this kind can arise frequently.
In this paper, we study the properties of priority-based clearing mechanisms for financial markets. We focus on payment schemes that constitute a pure Nash or even a strong equilibrium in the underlying strategic payment game for the firms. In this way, firms have no unilateral or coalitional incentives to deviate from the payment schemes proposed by the clearing mechanism. Depending on the granularity of priorities, the resulting games have different properties. In particular, if priorities are implemented over debt contracts, existence of a pure Nash or a strong equilibrium becomes strongly NP-hard to decide. Instead, if priorities are implemented over units of money, a strong equilibrium always exists and can be computed in strongly polynomial time. Moreover, in this case, there is even a strong equilibrium that maximizes the sum of all assets of all firms.
Our results imply interesting insights for bankruptcy settlement of insolvent firms. It turns out that only insolvent firms face a potential strategic decision about where to allocate money in order to maximize the internal assets through network effects (or, equivalently, minimize the remaining debt after clearing the network). In case there is a benevolent and centralized bankruptcy settlement, we show that it can implement a clearing mechanism with monotone payment strategies that leads to a socially optimal clearing state. It comes with the additional guarantee of giving no coalition of firms an incentive to pay their debts differently.
Instead, if clearing payments are determined by suitable negotiation in a decentralized fashion resulting in some arbitrary Nash or strong equilibrium, the total amount of internal assets available to the firms in the system can deteriorate drastically. Similar problems arise if a centralized clearing mechanism is restricted to payment schemes based on priorities over single loans (rather than units of money). This can lead to non-existence of pure equilibria in the resulting games. Even if equilibria exist, they can be undesirable since the total amount of internal assets of all firms can be drastically smaller than in an optimal solution. This shows a marked contrast between centralized and decentralized bankruptcy settlement and highlights how the structure of permissible payment strategies impacts the performance and the structural properties of the clearing mechanism.
Contribution
In this paper, we study the properties of priority-based clearing mechanisms for financial markets. We assume the network of liabilities is given, but insolvency resolution is driven by strategic considerations. In particular, we analyze payment schemes that constitute a pure Nash or even a strong equilibrium in the underlying strategic payment game for the firms.
Below we introduce basic preliminaries of the Eisenberg-Noe model. In addition, we introduce two classes of priority-based payment strategies for the firms and analyze the resulting clearing mechanisms. For an edge-ranking strategy, a firm ranks its debt contracts and assigns its assets in order of the ranking. As a superset of strategies, we consider coin-ranking strategies, where money is considered in units ("coins"). Instead of contracts, each firm ranks single coin payments to the contracts. By letting the value of a coin approach zero, coin-ranking strategies become equivalent to monotone strategies, where the payments of a firm are simply a monotone function of its total available assets.
In Section 2 we present structural insights on the clearing states for a strategy profile in an edgeor coin-ranking game. In such a profile, each firm is choosing an edge-or coin-ranking strategy to pay its debt. For each such profile, we prove that the possible clearing states form a lattice with respect to the vector of assets of each firm (Theorem 3). In particular, there is a unique clearing state that pointwise maximizes the assets available to each firm (given this strategy profile). It can be computed in strongly polynomial time (Corollary 4). We assume that this state defines the assets and, thus, the utility of each firm in the strategy profile. Similar properties were shown in [10] for profiles composed of pro-rata payment strategies.
In Section 3 we study coin-ranking games and strategic choice of payments. Our interest lies in the existence, computational complexity, and social quality of equilibria. We show that there always is a strategy profile that represents a strong equilibrium, in which no coalition of firms has an incentive to deviate. Furthermore, it maximizes social welfare, i.e., the sum of all assets or total revenue available to all firms. Such a strong equilibrium can be computed in strongly polynomial time (Theorem 7). It can represented compactly, even though the strategy shall rank all (possibly pseudo-polynomially many) coins that a firm might have available. In contrast, it is strongly NP-hard to find a best-response strategy for a single firm in a given arbitrary strategy profile of a coin-ranking game (Theorem 10).
When considering worst-case equilibria and the strong price of anarchy, we show that the deterioration of social welfare in a strong equilibrium compared to a social optimum is tightly characterized by the min-max length of cycles in any social optimum (Theorem 12). This implies that networks with optimal money circulation composed of small cycles yield a small inefficiency in strong equilibria. In contrast, a worst-case Nash equilibrium, which is stable only against unilateral deviations, can be arbitrarily worse than a social optimum, even in simple games with a constant number of firms (Proposition 11).
In Section 4 we study equilibria in edge-ranking games, where all firms are restricted to play edgeranking strategies. Restricting the strategy space to rankings over contracts can have devastating consequences for the existence and social quality of equilibria. In edge-ranking games, pure Nash and strong equilibria can be absent, and deciding their existence is strongly NP-hard (Theorem 15). The same hardness applies for computing a social optimum, and for computing a pure Nash or strong equilibrium when it is guaranteed to exist. Even the best strong equilibrium can be a factor of Ω(n) worse than the social optimum in terms of social welfare (Proposition 17). For pure Nash equilibria, even the best one can be arbitrarily worse than a social optimum (Proposition 18).
Related Work
Financial Networks On a conceptual level, we study issues of strategic choice and computational complexity in financial networks. There have been works addressing computational complexity of diverse issues, such as pricing options with [2] and without information asymmetry [5] , finding clearing payments with credit default swaps [24] , or estimating the number of defaults when providing a shock in the financial system [16] . In addition, many extensions to the model by Eisenberg and Noe have been proposed in the literature on financial markets. However, even models including cross-holdings of equity [26] , default costs [23] , or debt contracts of different maturities [12] follow the idea of the basic approach that all contracts have to be cleared consistently, i.e. clearing payments locally adhere to the rather mechanical clearing rule and constitute a fixed point solution globally. Indeed, Barucca et al. [4] have recently shown that many of the above models can be unified in terms of self-consistent network valuations. A well-known result of such models is the "robust-yet-fragile" property exhibited by financial networks, i.e., contagion arises in an all-or-nothing fashion akin to the formation of a giant connected component in random graph models [13] . This provides important insights into systemic risk and advises the need for macro-prudential regulation.
Accordingly, the rather mechanical pro-rata payments are also usually presumed in models studying contagion effects arising from overlapping portfolios [6, 7] . In this case, distressed firms are selling assets which in turn decreases the value of these assets by market impact. Here, it is commonly assumed that firms mechanically sell all their assets in a pro-rata fashion. In turn, the resulting market impact is modeled as a known function parametrized by the market depth or liquidity of each asset. In contrast, especially decisions regarding the portfolio composition of financial firms yield substantial potential for strategic consideration in reality.
To our knowledge, strategic aspects are currently reflected only in models of network formation [1, 11] . A three period economy is assumed where firms can invest into risky assets. To do so, they strategically decide to borrow funds from outside investors as well as other firms. Thereby a network of financial cross-holdings is endogenously formed as each firm maximizes their expected profit. The results show that risk-seeking firms tend to over-connect leading to stronger contagion and systemic risk as compared to the socially optimal risk-sharing allocation. Note that in this case, strategic aspects only play a role in the formation of inter-bank relations whereas the clearing mechanism is assumed to follow the same process as in [10] .
Flow Games On a more technical level, our game-theoretic approach is related to a number of existing game-theoretic models based on flows in networks. In cooperative game theory, there are several notions of flow games based on a directed flow network. Existing variants include games, where edges are players [3, 8, 9, 14, 17, 18] , or each player owns a source-sink pair [21, 22] . The total value of a coalition C is the profit from a maximum (multi-commodity) flow that can be routed through the network if only the players in C are present. There is a rich set of results on structural characterizations and computability of solutions in the core, as well as other solution concepts for cooperative games. In contrast to our work, these games are non-strategic. Instead, here we consider each player as a single node with a strategic decision about flow allocation.
More recently, a class of strategic flow games has been proposed in [15, 20] . There is a capacitated flow network with a set of sources nodes. At each source node, a given amount of flow enters the network. Each node of the network is owned by a single player. Each player always owns a designated sink node, as well as one or more additional nodes from the network. A player can choose a flow strategy for each of her nodes. The flow strategy specifies, for every node v and every x ≥ 0, how an incoming flow of x at v is distributed onto the outgoing edges (if any). Each flow strategy needs to fulfill flow conservation constraints at every node, subject to capacity on the outgoing edges. Each player aims to maximize the incoming flow at its sink node.
For these games there exist a number of Σ p 2 -completeness results for, e.g., determining the value of a game in a two-player Stackelberg variant, or determining the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium in a multi-player variant. In the latter game, computing a best response can also be NP-hard. Our approach is related to these games. However, motivated by financial networks we assume each firm is a single (source) node. The firm optimizes the incoming flow at its node (without it being a sink node). We study the computational complexity and social quality of equilibria. Moreover, strategic incentives arise mainly from cycles in the network -a condition absent in the existing work on max-flow games [15, 20] where the network is assumed to be acyclic.
Financial Networks with Payment Strategies
Network Model. We consider a financial network model due to Eisenberg and Noe [10] . There is a network G = (V, E) with node set V of institutions or firms. Each firm v ∈ V has external assets of value a x v ≥ 0. Moreover, the firms are related via a set E of liabilities. Each liability (u, v) ∈ E is a directed edge from firm u ∈ V to firm v ∈ V . The weight c(e) ≥ 0 of some edge e = (u, v) is the amount of money that u owes to v. We denote by E + (v) = {(v, u) ∈ E} and by E − (v) = {(u, v) ∈ E} the set of outgoing and incoming edges of v ∈ V , respectively. The total liabilities ℓ(v) of firm v is the total amount of money firm v owes to other firms, i.e.,
We strive to understand issues of computational complexity. As such, we will assume that all numbers in the input, i.e., all a x v and c(e), are integer numbers. We consider clearing mechanisms based on strategic payments decisions. A money flow f e on edge e satisfies 0 ≤ f e ≤ c(e). Given a money flow on each edge, the internal assets of firm v are the total incoming money from other firms, i.e.,
The total assets of v are the sum of external and internal assets a v = a x v + a i v . A firm is insolvent if its total assets are strictly smaller than its total liabilities, i.e., a v < ℓ(v).
Eisenberg and Noe define a clearing mechanism with money flows given by pro-rata payments. In their clearing mechanism, each firm v distributes its total assets a v proportionally on its outgoing edges until all debt is paid. More formally, every edge e ∈ E + (v) is assigned a money flow of
Payment Strategies. In this paper, we analyze incentives when firms strategically manipulate their payments. As such, we study money flow games defined as follows. Each firm v ∈ V chooses as a strategy a parametrized flow function f e (y) for every outgoing edge e ∈ E + (v) and every y ≥ 0.
Intuitively, the strategy specifies, for every possible value y ≥ 0 of total assets available to firm v, how v will allocate these assets to pay its debts. The capacity constraint ensures that no debt is overpaid, the no-fraud constraint requires that v does not embezzle assets as long as there is unpaid debt. This definition includes pro-rata payments as one possible strategy profile. Given a strategy profile f = (f v ) v∈V , a clearing state a = (a v ) v∈V is a vector of assets such that
holds for all nodes v ∈ V . The utility of firm v is a v , i.e., v's goal is to choose a strategy to maximize its total assets in the clearing state.
Proposition 1. If all f e (y) are continuous, there exists at least one clearing state.
The proof is a straightforward application of Brouwer's fixed point theorem and thus omitted. If strategies are not continuous, it is easy to construct examples where no clearing state exists. Still, even for a continuous strategy profile f , there could be multiple clearing states a (even for pro-rata profiles). Given sufficiently complex strategy profiles with compact representation, computation of a clearing state might even become computationally difficult.
Edge-Ranking Games. In the rest of the paper, we focus on a set of rich and meaningful strategy spaces, for which we can single out a unique clearing state with a simple algorithm. An intuitive and well-motivated class of strategies can be derived via rankings or seniorities. In an edge-ranking game, each player v ∈ V spends its assets to pay its debts according to a strict and total order over E + (v), which we represent by a permutation π v = (e 1 , e 2 , . . .). v first pays all debt of edge e 1 = π v (1), then e 2 = π v (2), etc. until all debt is paid or it runs out of assets. Formally, f e i (y) = min{c(e i ), max{0, y − j<i c(e j )}}. The edge-ranking strategy of v is fully described by the ranking π v , hence we denote a strategy profile in edge-ranking games by π = (π v ) v∈V .
Coin-Ranking Games. As a strict superset of such strategies, consider the case where each player v ∈ V can spend its assets to pay its debts in a monotone fashion. In coin-ranking games, we rely on integrality of all values for c e and a x v , and interpret money flow as being discretized into "coins" of value 1. Thus, for a coin-ranking strategy, the parametrized flow functions f e (y) for every outgoing edge e ∈ E + (v) are defined on the non-negative integer numbers f e (y) : N 0 → N 0 . They are characterized by capacity and no-fraud constraints, and, for every y,
Note that, by letting the value of a coin tend to 0, coin-ranking strategies become arbitrary monotone strategies f e (y) :
Coin-ranking strategies generalize edge-ranking strategies. Maybe counterintuitively, every coinranking game is also a special edge-ranking game -replacing each edge e with weight c(e) many multi-edges of unit weight expands a coin-ranking game into an equivalent edge-ranking game. This expansion implies a pseudo-polynomial blow-up in representation size. Nevertheless, the structural equivalence will turn out to be very useful for characterizing and analyzing solutions to coin-ranking games.
Intuitively, when playing a coin-ranking strategy in the expanded edge-ranking game, a player v pays the first coin of assets to the multi-edge π v (1), the second coin to π v (2), etc. until all debt is paid or v runs out of assets. Hence, the representation of a coin-ranking strategy might require pseudopolynomial size (even in the original non-expanded game). We discuss this issue below in Section 3.1. It turns out that in every coin-ranking game, we can restrict attention to a subset of compactly representable coin-ranking strategies.
Clearing States and Utilities. For a given strategy profile π in an edge-or coin-ranking game, we determine the utility using a clearing stateâ, where we choose the one that maximizes the total revenue in the network, i.e., the sum of total assets available to all firms
In many cases the clearing state is unique, and there is no choice based on maximum revenue. Moreover, in case there are several clearing states in an edge-ranking game, it turns out that they can be arranged into a lattice with coordinate-wise maximum inducing a partial order. We choose the coordinate-wise maximal clearing state, since it maximizes Rev(π, a) as a natural measure of social welfare. In this sense, the properties of edge-ranking games mirror the conditions shown for pro-rata payments in [10] . We prove these conditions in the subsequent section.
Clearing States

Circulation Structure in Money Flow Games
Let us briefly point out a useful circulation representation of clearing states in money flow games. Given a strategy profile f , the fixed point and no-fraud constraints imply for any clearing state a the conservation of money flow. Now using an auxiliary source s, we can represent all money flows in a in the form of a circulation. We build an circulation network G ′ by adding node s, for every v ∈ V we add an auxiliary edge (v, s) with capacity c((v, s)) = ∞, and for every v ∈ V with a x v > 0 we add an auxiliary edge (s, v) with c((s, v)) = a x v . In this way, external assets of v become internal assets via a flow on edge (s, v). Similarly, surplus assets of w become a flow on edge (w, s), and hence the internal assets of s. Proposition 2. For every clearing state a of a strategy profile f in a money flow game, the flow in G ′ can be decomposed and represented as a circulation. The auxiliary source s has assets of a s = v∈V a x v , and all auxiliary edges (s, v) are saturated. Proof. This is a simple consequence of fixed point and no-fraud constraints. Surplus at firm v ∈ E exists only if v pays all debt
Moreover, the total external assets constitute the total net revenue:
The net revenue of every firm gets routed to the auxiliary source s and constitutes the assets a s .
x v , and all auxiliary edges (s, v) are saturated. Overall, by routing the surplus assets to s, we obtain exact flow conservation at every node. As such, the flow can be decomposed and represented as a circulation.
Structure, Uniqueness, and Computation for Edge-Ranking Games
Consider an arbitrary edge-ranking game and a strategy profile π. We exploit the monotone structure of strategies π v to show a structural insight into clearing states. Let A be the set of feasible clearing states for a strategy profile π. Every clearing state a ∈ A corresponds one-to-one to a special cycle flow in the graph. We use this structural insight to show that (A, ≥) forms a lattice with the coordinate-wise comparison. Formally, a ≥ a ′ iff a v ≥ a ′ v for all v; and a > a ′ iff a v ≥ a ′ v for all v and a v > a ′ v for at least one v. As a consequence, there is a unique revenue-maximizing clearing stateâ. It can be computed in polynomial time.
Necessary Cycles. For a given strategy profile π, consider the circulation network G ′ = (V ′ , E ′ ) with auxiliary source s and the corresponding auxiliary edges. For completeness, we treat s as a firm with a fixed strategy π s over its outgoing auxiliary edges. Due to Proposition 2, s exactly fill all outgoing edges in every clearing state. As such, the strategy of π s has no impact on the set of clearing states. We also extend π v and define the auxiliary edge (v, s) to be the last edge chosen by vertex v.
Consider a firm v ∈ V and some certain amount of k coins that have already been paid by v. Then there is a uniquely defined outgoing edge for the next coin reaching v. We call this edge the active edge of v. Every firm v always starts paying debt on the highest ranked edge π v (1). If some edge (v, w) = π v (k) is saturated, the firm switches its active edge from π v (k) to π v (k + 1). Now, consider the set of all active edges for a ≡ 0. Every firm v = s has exactly one outgoing active edge π v (1). The set of active edges must be partitioned into disjoint cycles with attached trees. Each tree attached to a cycle is rooted in a node from the cycle, and directed towards the cycle C. We define the orbit of C by
i.e., the set of nodes v from which we can reach C over top-ranked edges. Now, consider the auxiliary source s. Note that a ≡ 0 is a feasible clearing state in G ′ , but a s = ℓ(s) is a necessary constraint to ensure that a represents a clearing state in the original graph G. However, as long as a s < ℓ(s) there is an active outgoing edge of s and all nodes (including s) belong to some orbit. Hence, there is a cycle C with s ∈ o(C). Flow conservation in clearing states and the monotonicity of strategies implies that some amount of assets of s must eventually reach C. Due to flow conservation in C, a flow of at least δ C = min{c(e) | e ∈ C} must thus be present on every edge of C. This is a necessary condition in every clearing state a ∈ A.
It is straightforward to inductively apply this argument, thereby obtaining a sequence of necessary cycles C that must be filled with flow δ C = min{c(e) − f e | e ∈ C}. In particular, when a flow of f e = δ C has been assigned to every edge e ∈ C, the top-ranked edge of at least one of the vertices in C changes. This implies that the orbits change, i.e., the orbit o(C) partitions into new suborbits, or parts that get attached to other orbits. Note that once a vertex v has filled all regular outgoing edges, the top-ranked edge becomes (v, s).
Note that orbits present at the same time are always mututally disjoint. Thus, for two existing orbits o(C 1 ) and o(C 2 ), pushing flow along C 1 can never change the top-ranked edges of o(C 2 ). Hence, it is necessary that all the cycles C, where s eventually appears in the orbit, must get assigned a flow increase δ C in order to reach a s = ℓ(s). Once we reach a state a where a s = ℓ(s), an "orbit" o(s) emerges composed of a tree rooted in s. At this point, we have indeed constructed a feasible clearing state, which by induction is the unique minimal clearing state in G ′ that applies in G.
Optional Cycles. In the following, we characterize the structure of all other feasible clearing states a ∈ A by applying similar observations. Fix some feasible clearing state a (with a s = ℓ(s)) and consider the set of all active edges.
Suppose there is a cycle C with some orbit o(C), i.e., a set of nodes v that are not attached to the tree rooted in s. In this case, one can push a non-zero amount of flow along C, i.e. increase a v by a strictly positive amoung for every v ∈ C. This obviously yields a new feasible clearing state. When an edge becomes saturated, the set of active edges changes and the orbit o(C) disappears, i.e., gets spilt up as explained above (new suborbits, parts attached to other orbits, parts attached to the tree rooted in s).
Note that there might exist multiple orbits at the same time and, thus, multiple possibilities to extend a by increasing flow along a cycle. However, as observed above, orbits present at the same time are always mututally disjoint, and pushing flow along cycle C 1 can never change the top-ranked edges in an orbit o(C 2 ) present at that time. Now consider some vertex v ∈ o(C). In order to create some clearing state a ′ with a ′ v > a v it is necessary to push flow along C until a v is reached (if v ∈ o(C) ∩ C) or o(C) disappears and spilts up (if v ∈ o(C) \ C). Since the flow adjustments monotonically increase all assets, there is a one-to-one correspondence between sets of cycles with flow increase and the clearing states.
Note that the cycles chosen for flow increase form a partial order: A cycle C ′ might not be present in the beginning -there might be predecessor-cycles C that have to be filled up to δ C to break an existing orbit o(C), change some of the top-ranked edges, and make C ′ appear. In the argumentation above, it can be seen that the set of predecessor cycles pred(C ′ ) for some cycle C ′ is uniquely defined resulting from the ranking of edges in π.
Theorem 3. For every strategy profile π in an edge-or coin-ranking game, the pair (A, ≥) forms a lattice.
Proof. We show that for two feasible clearing states a 1 and a 2 , there is a unique maximal element a + given by a + v = max{a 1 v , a 2 v }. Similarly, for two feasible clearing states a 1 and a 2 , there is a unique minimal element a + given by a − v = min{a 1 v , a 2 v }. It remains to show that a + and a − are clearing states in A.
We only prove the statement for a − , the proof for a + is similar. Consider the two clearing states a 1 and a 2 . By the one-to-one correspondence to flow assignments on cycles described above, there is a set of cycles along which we pushed flow in order to reach a 1 . For every cycle C ∈ G ′ , let f a 1 (C) be the flow increase that was executed along C for a 1 . We define f a 2 (C) similarly.
Consider a 3 arising from flow increases f a 3 (C) = min{f a 1 (C), f a 2 (C)}. We show that a 3 is a feasible clearing state. Fix a cycle C. If f a 1 (C) > 0, then for every C ′ ∈ pred(C) we have f a 1 (C ′ ) = δ C ′ . The same holds when f a 2 (C) > 0. Thus, for every C with f a 3 (C) > 0, we conclude that f a 3 (C ′ ) = δ C ′ for every C ′ ∈ pred(C). As such, the flow assignment meets the requirements for a feasible cycle flow specificed above. Due to the one-to-one correspondence between clearing states and cycle flows, we conclude that the resulting asset vector a 3 is indeed a feasible clearing state.
It remains to show that
Consider the set of all cycles that contain v, i.e.,
Now suppose there are two cycles C, C ′ ∈ C v with C ′ = C that can in the resolution of money flow for π. The orbits for C and C ′ must be overlapping, so they cannot be present at the same time.
Based on the ranking in π, there is one cycle, say C, that arises earlier. Clearly, flow increase on C ′ can only be executed if o(C) has disappeared. As such C ∈ pred(C ′ ). More generally, this shows that the cycles from C v that can arise in the resolution of money flow for π can be totally ordered with respect to the predecessor relation. Therefore, if a v 1 ≤ a v 2 , then for a 2 we must implement flow increases along cycles according to the total order of predecessors for v. This implies that f a 1 (C) ≤ f a 2 (C) for all C ∈ C v . Hence, f a 3 (C) = f a 1 (C) for all C ∈ C v and, thus, a 3 v = a 1 v . This proves that a 3 = a − , therefore a − is a feasible clearing state.
The proof for a + follows analogously using a pointwise maximum instead of a minimum.
The arguments above imply a natural algorithm to computeâ, which is similar in spirit to the classic TopTradingCycles algorithm for house allocation [25] . The TopCycleIncrease algorithm iteratively raises money flow along cycles among the top-ranked edges in the circulation network G ′ . Thereby it computes the unique maximal clearing stateâ from the lattice. The algorithm runs in polynomial time -in every round it increases the flow along a cycle C by δ C . At this point at least one edge (from G or auxiliary) becomes saturated. In terms of the original network G = (V, E), the algorithm needs at most O(|V | + |E|) rounds. Each round can easily be implemented in strongly polynomial time. Solvent Firms. The previous results address uniqueness ofâ for a given strategy profile π. We conclude this section with the following interesting property, which shows that the clearing statê a is unique as long as all insolvent firms stick to their strategy. As such, the strategies of solvent firms have no impact on the asset vectorâ. For any solvent firm v, every strategy constitutes a best response.
Proposition 5. For a given edge-ranking game, consider any strategy profile π, the corresponding clearing stateâ, and any solvent firm v withâ v ≥ ℓ(v). Every strategy π ′ v is a best response for v against the other strategies π −v and results in the same clearing stateâ.
Proof. Consider a deviation π ′ v , the resulting state π ′ = (π ′ v , π −v ) and the resulting revenue-maximizing clearing state a ′ . Supposeâ = a ′ . Firm v is solvent underâ, thus e∈E + (v) f e (â v ) = l(v) and f e (â v ) = c(e). Using Theorem 3 we can assume w.l.o.g. thatâ > a ′ (i.e.,â u ≥ a ′ u for all firms u, andâ w > a ′ w for at least one firm w). We construct an equivalent game, in which we remove all edges in E + (v) and instead increase external assets toā x (u) = a x u + c(e) for all u with (v, u) ∈ E + (v). Observe thatâ is still a feasible clearing state in the constructed game. However, any clearing state a in the original game with a v ≥ l(v) induces f (a v ) = c(e) independent of the chosen strategies of v due to the non-fraud condition. Thus, any clearing state a with a v ≥ l(v) in the new game is still a feasible clearing state in the old game. We conclude thatâ is a feasible clearing state under π ′ . This is a contradiction to the maximality of a ′ .
3 Coin-Ranking Games
Representation
An instance of a money flow game is given by the network G and integer numbers for edge weights c(e) and external assets a x u . Hence, the representation of the instance is logarithmic in input numbers for c(e) and a x u . In contrast, if we consider arbitrary coin-ranking strategies f v for firm v, this specifies a ranking over all coins of value 1. This is linear in e∈E + (v) c(e) and, thus, only pseudo-polynomial in the instance representation. Our first observation is that in every coin-ranking game, we can restrict attention to threshold-ranking strategies with a polynomial representation. A thresholdranking strategy π t v = (π v , τ v ) is composed of a permutation π v over E + (v) and a vector of thresholds
The interpretation is as follows. In π t v , firm v first pays τ e to every edge e ∈ E + (v), sequentially in the order given by π v . Then, it pays the remaining c(e) − τ e to every edge in the order given by π v . That is, v first considers edge π v (1) and pays the first τ πv(1) coins to this edge. The next τ πv (2) coins are paid to edge π v (2) etc. until
τ πv(j) coins are paid to the edges (or v runs out of assets). Then, the remaining c(π v (1)) − τ πv(1) coins are paid to edge π v (1), then the next c(π v (2)) − τ πv (2) coins to π v (2) etc.
The following proposition shows that we can restrict attention to threshold-ranking strategies in coin ranking games. Proposition 6. For every strategy profile f in a coin-ranking game with clearing stateâ and every firm v, there is a threshold-ranking strategy π t v such that the profile (π t v , π −v ) has the same clearing stateâ and, thus, the same utilities for all firms.
Proof. In this proof, we use the egde-ranking representation of coin-ranking games. Let π denote the strategy profile in the edge-ranking representation. If v is solvent inâ, the result follows from Proposition 5 above. Consider an insolvent firm v. For the profile π consider the TopCycleIncrease algorithm that computes the clearing stateâ. Since v is insolvent, there is some unpaid, top-ranked unit-weight multi-edge (v, w) when the algorithm terminates. For the threshold-ranking strategy π t v , we let π v (1) = (v, w). The other edges are assigned in arbitrary order. We assign thresholds τ e = f e (â v ), i.e., equal to the money flow on edge e in the clearing stateâ.
Observe thatâ remains a clearing state in the profile (π t v , π −v ). Thus, deviating from π v to π t v does not decrease v's assets. On the other hand, once the algorithm has assigned assets ofâ v to v, it pays exactly τ e to every edge e ∈ E + (v). Then v starts paying for the remaining portions, so π v = (v, w) is the top-ranked edge. As such, v has the same status as in the end of the algorithm on π. Hence, v cannot be part of any further cycle of top-ranked edges, since otherwise this would have been the case in π as well. Therefore,â is the maximum-revenue clearing state for (π t v , π −v ).
Existence and Computation of Equilibria
Our first result is that in every coin-ranking game there is a strong equilibrium that maximizes the total revenue of all firms. This strong equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time. In particular, consider the instance (G, c, a x ) as a money flow game and an arbitrary clearing state, i.e., a circulation of maximum value in the circulation network G ′ . This circulation is also a clearing state of a strong equilibrium in threshold-ranking strategies.
Theorem 7. For every coin-ranking game, there is a strong equilibrium with money flows that maximize the total revenue in the network. The strong equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. Consider the circulation network G ′ = (V, E ′ ). An optimal circulation f * that maximizes the total flow value saturates all outgoing auxiliary edges from s. Hence, it maximizes the total assets of all firms
f * can be computed in strongly polynomial time [27] . Since all edge weights are integral, we can assume all f * e are integral. We can turn this circulation into a clearing state for a strategy profile with threshold-ranking strategies. Every firm v chooses an arbitrary order π v over E + (v) and sets thresholds τ e = f * e . Clearly, in this strategy profile the optimal circulation corresponds to the maximum-revenue clearing stateâ.
Let us prove that this strategy profile π is a strong equilibrium. A coalition C ⊆ V of firms has a profitable deviation π ′ C = (π ′ v ) v∈C if upon joint deviation of C to π ′ C , the resulting assets a ′ in the new profile (π ′ C , π −C ) are strictly better, i.e. a ′ v >â v for every v ∈ C. We will show that no coalition C ⊆ V has a profitable deviation.
Suppose for contradiction that there is a coalition C with a profitable deviation. Examine the new profile (π ′ C , π −C ) and consider a firm v ∈ C. Since a ′ v >â v , there must be an edge (u, v) ∈ E − (v) that has strictly more incoming flow in the new profile f ′ e (a ′ u ) > f e (a u ). Now consider node u. If u ∈ C, then a ′ u > a u , so there is again some edge E − (u) that has strictly more incoming flow in the new profile. Otherwise, if u ∈ C, then u still plays the threshold-ranking strategy obtained from f * . Since this is a monotone strategy, a higher flow on (u, v) can only occur if u has larger assets. Thus, a ′ u > a u , so there is again some edge E − (u) that has more incoming flow in the new profile. We can repeat this argument indefinitely. As such, there must be a cycle of edges that all have more flow under (π ′ C , π −C ) than under π. Such a cycle, however, can be used to increase the flow circulation. This contradicts thatâ represents an optimal circulation. Remark 8. Observe that for the profitable deviation, we can even allow arbitrary continuous strategies and any choice of clearing state for the deviation profile. As such, the strategy profile obtained from f * is a strong equilibrium even in general money flow games (with suitable choice of clearing state).
Remark 9. It is essential to require pointwise strict improvement for a deviation. For a so-called super-strong equilibrium one allows deviations that weakly improve the coalition (i.e., a ′ u ≥â u for all u ∈ C and a ′ v >â v for at least one v ∈ C). It is a simple exercise to see that there are coin-ranking games, in which a super-strong equilibrium does not exist.
While it is computationally easy to compute a socially optimal strong equilibrium, computing a best-response strategy for a general strategy profile can be strongly NP-hard, since best responses can provide answers to computationally hard decision problems. For the following result, we assume the coin-ranking game is given in the edge-ranking representation as a network with unit-weight multi-edges. Note that the edge weights in our instances of interest can be restricted to the set {0, 1}. Thus, our construction needs no multi-edges, and the representation incurs no overhead.
Theorem 10. For a given strategy profile f of a coin-ranking game, deciding whether a given firm v has a best response resulting in assets at least k is strongly NP-complete. This holds even in coin-ranking games without external assets and all edge weights in {0, 1}. Proof. For coin-ranking games with constant edge weights and external assets, the decision problem is obviously contained in NP. We can represent the network with unit-weight multi-edges and every strategy as a rankings over edges. This transformation takes polynomial time. Then, our algorithm to computeâ runs in polynomial time.
For strong NP-hardness, we are given any instance I of Satisfiability in conjunctive normal form with n variables and m clauses. We construct a coin-ranking game in edge-ranking representation with a player v and a strategy profile π −v for the other players such that the following holds: There is a strategy π v with assets a v ≥ k = k ′ + n in (π v , π −v ) if and only if I has a variable assignment that fulfills at least k ′ clauses.
We construct the game as follows. We denote the variables of I by x 1 , . . . , x n and the clauses by C 1 , . . . , C m . For each variable x i we create firms x i,j,0 and x i,j,1 for all j ∈ {1, . . . , m}, as well as a firm z i . For each clause C j we add a clause firm c j . In addition, there is a global firm v, for which we strive to find a best response.
For each clause C j , we add a unit-weight edge from x i,j,0 to c j if x i appears as ¬x i in C j and from x i,j,1 to c j if it appears as x i in C j . Flow incoming to c j will eventually indicate a literal that fulfills the clause C j . There is an edge (c j , v) for all j ∈ {1, . . . , m}. We will show below that this edge ensures that satisfying clause C j adds exactly one unit of assets to a v .
For each variable x i , we add a variable gadget. It consists of nodes v, x i,j,0 and x i,j,1 for all j ∈ {1, . . . , m}, as well as auxiliary nodes z i , z i,0 and z i,1 . There are unit-weight edges (v, x i,j,0 ) and (v, x i,j,1 ) for all j ∈ {1, . . . , m}, edges (x i,j,0 , x i,j+1,0 ), (x i,j,1 , x i,j+1,1 ) for j ∈ {1, . . . , m−1}, and edges (v, z i,0 ), (z i,0 , x i,1,0 ) and (v, z i,1 ), (z i,1 , x i,1,1 ). Firm z i has edges (x i,m,0 , z i ), (x i,m,1 , z i ), and (z i , v). An example for the gadget that is constructed for a variable x i and m = 4 is depicted in Fig. 1a . Note that for every strategy of v, there is at most one cycle emerging in this gadget, since all cycles must include the outgoing edge of z i .
In Fig. 1b, we show an example of the network without the variable gadgets for the Satisfiability
We construct a strategy profile π −v as follows. Observe that firms c 1 , . . . , c m and x 1 , . . . , x n each have a single outgoing edge, their strategies are fixed. If a firm x i,j,0 or x i,j,1 has multiple outgoing edges, it always prioritizes the edge to nodes x i,j+1,0 and x i,j+1,1 , respectively, or to z i if j = m.
In the following, we argue that there is a best response of v with asset value k ′ + n if and only if there is a variable assignment such that k ′ clauses are fulfilled in I. Suppose there is a variable assignment such that k ′ clauses are fulfilled. Fix this assignment and for every satisfied clause c choose a single literal l c that evaluates to true in the clause. Let v choose the following strategy: First, prioritize edges (v, x i,1,0 ) if x a = false in the assignment and (v, x i,1,1 ) if x a = true in the assignment. All theses edges will close a cycle (v, x i,1,0 , x i,2,0 , . . . ,
After that, for all clause-fulfilling literals l c prioritize the edges (v, x i,j,0 ) if c = C j and l c = ¬x i in any order. Prioritize the edges (v, x i,j,1 ) if c = C j and l c = x i . All these edges close a cycle via the clause node c j , leading to a total inflow of k ′ + x.
For showing the other direction, we observe the following structural property for all variables x i . If there is some flow on an edge (x i,m,0 , z i ) there cannot be any flow on edge (x i,m,1 , z i ), and vice versa. We conclude that flow on some edge (x i,j,0 , c j ) implies flow on edge (x i,j,0 , x i,j+1,0 ) (since it has a higher priority), and (x i,m,0 , z i ), and thus no flow on (x i,j ′ ,1 , c j ′ ) for all j ′ . Analogously, we observe that any flow on some edge (x i,j,0 , c j ) implies no flow on edges (x i,j ′ ,1 , c j ′ ).
We observe that if there is a best response of player v with inflow equal to k ′ + n, node v has k ′ + n incoming edges that carry flow. At most n of these edges can be (z i , v)-edges, so there are at least k ′ clause-edges (c j , v) that carry flow. Thus, all these k ′ clause vertices receive incoming flow. If this flow for some clause c j comes from a node x i,j,0 , we know by the observation above that no edge x i,j ′ ,1 carries flow. Thus we can set the variable x i to false, which fulfills clause C j . Applying this and analogous operations for flow on an edge (x i,j,1 , v) yields a variable assignment which fulfills at least k ′ clauses.
Total Revenue of Equilibria
In this section, we analyze the total revenue in pure Nash and strong equilibria. We relate this value to the social optimum, i.e., the total sum of assets for all firms in the best strategy profile. Clearly, since we proved existence of a system optimal strong equilibrium, the price of stability for Nash and strong equilibria are both 1. We bound the prices of anarchy for Nash and strong equilibria.
Proposition 11. The price of anarchy for Nash equilibria is unbounded, even coin-ranking games without external assets.
Proof. Consider the game depicted on the right. All edges have unit weight, all external assets are 0. Consider π with π 1 = (e 1 , e 3 ) and π 2 = (e 2 , e 4 ). It is a pure Nash equilibrium with total revenue 0, since no player can unilaterally close a cycle and increase the value of the circulation. However, the optimal solution π * with π * 1 = (e 3 , e 1 ) and π * 2 = (e 4 , e 2 ) has total revenue 2. The total revenue depends crucially on the emergence of cycles in the strategy profile. This requires an effort that is inherently coalitional, as such it might be unsurprising that in general Nash equilibria fail to provide good revenue guarantees.
To analyze the quality of strong equilibria, we again consider the coin-ranking game in the form of unit-weight multi-edges. Consider an optimal circulation f * of maximum total revenue in the circulation network G ′ . Since we have unit-weight edges, we can assume that the optimal circulation has binary flows on each edge. Let C(f * ) = {C 1 , . . . , C k } be a decomposition of f * into cycles of unit Theorem 12. In coin-ranking games, the strong price is anarchy is at most d.
Proof.
Consider an optimal circulation f * and a decomposition C(f * ) such that all flow cycles C i ∈ C(f * ) have size at most |C i | ≤ d. The total revenue in f * is given by
since the circulation also accounts for the assets of the auxiliary source s. Now consider a strong equilibrium π in the coin-ranking game with clearing stateâ. It yields a binary money flow in the network. Suppose there is a cycle C i ∈ C(f * ) such that f e (â u ) = 0 for all e = (u, v) ∈ C i . Then the firms in this cycle have an incentive to jointly deviate and place the edges of C i on first position in their ranking. Then the clearing stateâ will emerge as before, adding a flow of 1 along the cycle C i . This is a profitable deviation for the firms of C i .
Consequently, for every cycle C i ∈ C(f * ) there must be at least one edge e = (u, v) ∈ C i such that f e (a u ) = 1. Thus, the revenue in the strong equilibrium π is Rev(π,â) ≥ Proof. The game is given by a graph G with d + (d − 1)(d − 2) firms. G is constructed as follows. The firms v 1 , . . . , v d are called central firms and they form a cycle of length d. For each i = 1, . . . , d − 1, there are firms (v i,j ) j=1,...,d−2 that form additional cycles of length d with the edge (v i , v i+1 ). Thus, the set of edges is given by
All edges have unit weight. An example of the instance with d = 5 is depicted in Fig. 2 . Observe that only firms v i , i = 2, . . . , d have multiple outgoing edges. We claim that
is a strong equilibrium. In order to see this, letâ be the clearing state corresponding to π. The clearing state is given bŷ
that is, Rev(π,â) = d. Now, assume there is a non-empty coalition of player S ⊆ (v 2 , . . . , v d ) that all strictly increase their assets by a joint deviation. Note that v d only has a single incoming edge,
, v d−1 cannot carry any flow. We conclude that v d−1 has only a single edge that can carry flow. Iterating this argument yields S = ∅, a contradiction.
However, the optimal flow emerges with
. It is easy to observe that this yields a total revenue of (d − 1)d. Thus, the strong price of anarchy in this instance is d − 1.
Edge-Ranking Games
Existence and Computation of Equilibria
Coin-ranking strategies allow a quite versatile allocation of single units of assets. In this section, we focus on a more coarse class of strategies, in which firms can simply rank their outgoing edges and allocate assets until all debts are paid for. In contrast to coin-ranking games, the restriction to edge-ranking strategies can destroy the existence of (optimal) stable states. In fact, there are even games without a single pure Nash equilibrium. There is an edge-ranking game without a pure Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Consider the game in Fig. 3 . The capacities of the edges are depicted next to the edges. Firms v 2 and v 3 each have external assets of 2, the other firms have 0 external assets. Firms v 1 , v 2 and v 3 are the only ones with multiple outgoing edges. The strategy choices of the other firms are fixed. Due to the symmetry of the network, we can assume w.l.o.g.
). There are two possible strategy choices for each of the nodes v 2 and v 3 . Checking all four resulting strategy profiles yields the following utility matrix for firms v 2 and v 3 .
Inspecting the utilities, we see that there is no pure Nash equilibrium.
The next theorem shows that a number of natural decision and optimization problems in edgeranking games are indeed computationally intractable. Note that for coin-ranking games, these problems are either trivial (a strong equilibrium always exists) or can be solved in polynomial time (a strong equilibrium, which also represents a profile with maximum total revenue, can be computed in strongly polynomial time).
Theorem 15. Given an edge-ranking game the following problems are strongly NP-hard: Proof. We start by proving hardness for computing a pure Nash or a strong equilibrium when it is guaranteed to exist.
Hardness of Computing Nash or Strong Equilibria. Consider an instance I of the problem 3-Dimensional-Matching. I is given by a finite set T with |T | = 3k and a set U ⊆ T × T × T . Karp [19] proved it is strongly NP-complete to decide whether there is a subset W ⊆ U such that |W | = k and no two elements of W have a non-empty intersection. The existence of such a set |W | would be an exact cover of T . Given an instance I of 3-Dimensional-Matching, we construct an instance of an edge-ranking game as follows. Create a central vertex v. For each set u ∈ U , create a vertex u and connect v to u by an edge (v, u) with capacity c((v, u)) = 3. For each pair t, u with t ∈ T , u ∈ U and t ∈ u we create a vertex t and add an edge (u, t) with capacity c((u, t)) = 1. Finally, we connect each element t ∈ T by an edge (t, v) with c((t, v)) = 1 to v. The idea is that computing any pure Nash or strong equilibrium reduces to finding a best response for player v. This best response, however, gives total assets of a v = 3k if and only if I has a solution. Hence, by computing a pure Nash or strong equilbrium, we obtain a best response for v and thereby a certificate as to whether I is solvable or not (and vice versa).
Let us first argue that there is always a strong equilibrium in this edge-ranking game. First, we note that all vertices t ∈ T have a single outgoing edge. We fix an arbitrary feasible strategy vector π ′ . We will argue that best-response dynamics yield a strong equilibrium. For every strategy of v, there is at most one vertex u i with a u i ∈ {1, 2}. For all other vertices u ∈ U \ {u i }, every strategy pi u is a best response for u due to Proposition 5. We conclude that if π ′ is not a strong equilibrium, there is a coalition S of players with an improvement move such that all players in S strictly increase their assets. If v / ∈ S, there is a player u i ∈ S ∪ U . The improving move of u i also increases assets of v. Thus, the assets of v increase in every step of the dynamics. This shows that the dynamics terminate with a strong equilibrium.
Let π be any Nash equilibrium in the edge-ranking game. We show the following claim. There is a subset W such that |W | = k and no two elements of W have a non-empty intersection in I if and only if a v = |T | in π.
First, let us assume that π is a Nash equilibrium with a v = |T |. Since each outgoing edge from v has capacity 3 and |T | = 3k, we know by the definition of edge-ranking games that |{u ∈ U | a u = 3}| = k. We denote these vertices by u 1 , . . . , u k . Thus, a u i = 3 for i ≤ k and a u i = 0 for all i > k. We will show that the sets corresponding to vertices u 1 , . . . , u k form a solution to I. Suppose there are two sets u 1 , u 2 that have a non-empty intersection. If this is the case, there is an element t ∈ T with t ∈ u 1 ∩ u 2 . There are edges (u 1 , t), (u 2 , t) in the edge-ranking game that carry flow. This is a contradiction to the fact that a v = |T |. Now, let us assume there is a solution u 1 , . . . , u k to I. We will show that every pure Nash equilibrium π in the edge-ranking game yields assets of a v = 3k for vertex v. The total capacity of all incoming edges of v is exactly 3k, so a v ≤ 3k clearly holds for all strategy profiles. We will now argue that independent of the strategy choices of all other players, player v can always obtain a v = 3k. Let π v = ((v, u 1 ), . . . , (v, u k ), . . . ). Since u 1 , . . . , u k exactly cover all elements t ∈ T , this induces 3k cycles in the TopCycleIncrease algorithm described above. This is independent of the strategy choices of all other vertices since they always have the property that either all outgoing edges are fully saturated, or there is no flow at all. This shows that even in a class of games with guaranteed existence, computing a pure Nash equilibrium or a strong equilibrium is strongly NP-hard. a cycle C of edges (w 1 , w 2 ) and (w 2 , w 3 ) with weight M ≫ 1, as well as edge (w 3 , w 1 ) with weight M − 2. In addition, there are edges (w 1 , v 6 ) and (w 2 , v 6 ) of weight 2.
In an optimal circulation, w 1 and w 2 prioritize the edges of C, leading to total revenue of Θ(M ). In contrast, a pure Nash equilibrium can only evolve if the w-firms ensure that the external assets of w 1 are routed to v 6 , in which case a Nash equilibrium can exist (as observed in the proof of Theorem 15 above). Clearly, both w 1 and w 2 have an incentive to deviate towards C. Hence, if either w 1 or w 2 places the edge to v 6 in first rank and the other does not, a unilateral deviation suffices to close C -thereby leaving the v-nodes with instability. However, if both w 1 and w 2 play strategies π w 1 = ((w 1 , v 6 ), (w 1 , w 2 )) and π w 2 = ((w 2 , v 6 ), (w 2 , w 3 )), no unilateral deviation can lead to flow along C. In this case, a pure Nash equilibrium evolves. Obviously the total revenue in this equilibrium are at most a constant. Hence, the price of stability is as large as Ω(M ).
Conclusions
In this paper, we have studied clearing mechanisms for financial networks and analyzed their properties from a computational and game-theoretic perspective. Our main results show that in these games, solvent firms have no strategic incentives, i.e., the game is played exclusively among insolvent firms. If firms are using coin-ranking strategies, every social optimum that maximizes the sum of all assets in the network constitutes a strong equilibrium. Moreover, it can be computed in strongly polynomial time. This result implies that a centralized bankruptcy settlement can achieve a clearing state, in which the social welfare is maximized and no coalition of firms gets incentivized to deviate. In contrast, when considering decentralized clearing and arbitrary strong equilibria, the social welfare depends on the length of cycles in the money circulation of a social optimum. For pure Nash equilibria, the deterioration in social welfare can be severe due to the lack of coordination among firms. Alternatively, when restricting the strategy spaces to edge-ranking strategies, we show that pure Nash and strong equilibria can be absent, hard to compute, and highly undesirable in terms of social welfare.
There are many open problems that arise from our work. For example, real-life markets involve a number of complex financial products (such as derivatives, credit-default swaps, etc.). Their impact on stability and computational complexity of financial markets is only beginning to attract attention in the literature. In this context, there are a variety of important game-theoretic aspects with respect to pricing, information revelation, or network creation, which are crucial for understanding financial markets and represent interesting avenues for future work.
